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Abstract
In this paper, we present a search model with divisible money in which there exists
a continuum of monetary equilibria with strictly increasing continuous value functions
and with non-discrete money holdings distributions.
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1 Introduction
Recently, real indeterminacy of stationary equilibria has been found in both speciﬁc and
general search models with divisible money. (See, for example, Green and Zhou [1] [2],
Kamiya and Shimizu [3], Matsui and Shimizu [4], and Zhou [7].) However, all the indeter-
minacy results found so far are limited to the case that value functions are step functions
and money holdings distributions are discrete ones. In this paper, we show that real inde-
terminacy can occur even in the case of strictly increasing continuous value functions and
non-discrete money holdings distributions.
In his introductory paper of symposium volume of Journal of Economic Theory, Wallace
[5] presents a conjecture that the indeterminacy result is not robust in the following sense:
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1The multiplicity is almost certainly not robust to departing from the assumption
that the money is a ﬁat object. That, is if nominal holdings of the ﬁat object
give utility (can be as paper weights or decoration or burned as fuel), then the
kind of multiplicity that has people treating x units of a ﬁat asset as a new ﬁat
object disappears. ([5] p.225)
Following this conjecture, Wallace and Zhu [6] introduce the concept of commodity-money
reﬁnement. To put it shortly, a stationary equilibrium satisﬁes the commodity-money re-
ﬁnement if it is also a limit of stationary equilibria as the consumption utility of money
goes to zero. Wallace and Zhu apply the concept to two speciﬁc models. In one model, the
commodity-money reﬁnement eliminates stationary equilibria with discrete money holdings
distributions, and in the other model the commodity-money reﬁnement eliminates station-
ary equilibria with value functions that are not strictly increasing, such as step-functions.1
One might think that Wallace and Zhu’s result veriﬁes the above conjecture, for all the
previous results of real indeterminacy in money search models are limited to the case of
discrete money holdings distributions and step value functions.2
The purpose of this note is to present a money search model in which there is a con-
tinuum of stationary equilibria with non-discrete money holdings distribution and strictly
increasing continuous value functions. Moreover, they satisfy the commodity-money reﬁne-
ment. In Section 2, we present the model, and then in Section 3 we present the indetermi-
nacy result and show that the stationary equilibria indeed satisﬁes the commodity-money
reﬁnement in the sense of Wallace and Zhu.
2 The Model
There is a continuum of agents with a mass of measure one. There are k ¸ 3 types of
agents with equal fractions and the same number of types of perfectly divisible goods. A
type i¡1 agent can produce type i good. (We assume that a type k agent produces type 1
good.) The production technology of each agent is characterized by a ﬁxed cost ¯ c > 0, zero
1Note that their results also depend upon their deﬁnition of reﬁnement. Zhou [8] deﬁnes the commodity-
money reﬁnement in another way and shows that there is a continuum of robust stationary equilibria with
discrete money holdings distributions and step value functions.
2Green and Zhou [2] construct non-stationary equilibria with non-discrete money holdings distributions,
but the stationary equilibria in their model have discrete money holdings distributions.
2marginal cost, and a capacity constraint ¯ q > 0, where ¯ c and ¯ q are common to all agents.





0; if q = 0;
¯ c; if 0 < q · ¯ q;
1; if ¯ q < q:
A type i agent obtains utility only when she consumes type i good and her utility function
is expressed by a linear function, u(q) = aq, where a > 0 is given and q is the amount of
good i. Note that a is common to all agents.
Time is discrete. In each period, each agent ﬁrst chooses either to be a consumer or a
seller. Then pairwise random matchings take place. Note that if an agent of type i chooses
to be a seller, then she cannot buy type i good even when she meet a type i ¡ 1 agent. If
a type i seller meets a type i + 1 buyer, then the seller makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer of
(qs;ps) without knowing the partner’s money holding, where qs is the maximum amount
of type i + 1 good she can sell and ps is the price of the good. Note that the seller knows
the money holdings distribution of the economy. Finally, when (qs;ps) is oﬀered, the type
i buyer chooses the amount of good qb · qs he wants to consume.
Let m0 2 [0;1] be the measure of agents without money and f : (0;1) ! R+ be a
density function of money holdings on (0;1). Of course, 1 ¡ m0 =
R
(0;1) fd´ must hold.
Let M > 0 be the nominal stock of ﬁat money and ¯ 2 (0;1) be the discount factor.
The conditions for a stationary equilibrium are (i) each agent maximizes the expected
value of utility-streams, i.e., the Bellman equation is satisﬁed, (ii) the money holdings
distribution of the economy is stationary, i.e., time-invariant, and (iii) the total amount of
money the agents have is equal to M.
We focus on stationary equilibria in which all agents with identical characteristics act
similar and in which all of the k types are symmetric.
3 The Results
The following theorem is the main result of the present paper.
Theorem 1 Let d =
a¯ q
¯ c . Suppose 3
2 < d · 3. Then there exists a ¯ 2 (0;1) such that,
for any given ¯ 2 (¯;1), there exists a continuum of stationary equilibria in which (i)
3the value functions are continuous, strictly increasing, and concave, and (ii) the money
holdings distributions have a full support in some closed interval with a nonempty interior.
Proof:
(I) We focus on the strategy satisfying the following: for some p > 0,
² an agent without money always chooses to be a seller and an agent with money
holding ´ > 0 always chooses to be a buyer,
² a seller always oﬀers (p; ¯ q),
² a buyer with money holding ´ > 0 consumes the following amount of her consumption
good: there exists a p(´) ¸ p such that, for given (ps;qs),
qb(´;ps;qs) =
(
minf´=ps;qsg if ps · p(´);
0 if ps > p(´);
(1)
² for some ¸ and ¾, f is expressed by
f(´) =
(
2¸´ + ¾; for ´ 2 (0;p¯ q];
0; for ´ 2 (p¯ q;1]:
(2)
Note that p, p(´), ¸, and ¾ will be determined as functions of m0 later.
(II) Next, we obtain a candidate for a value function V : R+ ! R consistent with the
above strategy. From the above strategy, V (´) for ´ 2 (0;1) can be written as a function

























; for ´ 2 (0;p¯ q]; (3)
where A(m0) = m0
k¡(k¡m0)¯. Note that A(m0) < 1. Similarly, V (´) for ´ 2 (p¯ q;1) is
written as:
V (´) = A(m0)(a¯ q + ¯V (´ ¡ p¯ q)); for ´ 2 (p¯ q;1): (4)





















(III) Below, we focus on equilibria with V (0) = 0 and obtain (p;¸;¾) as functions of m0.3
First, we decompose ´ ¸ 0 into an multiple of p¯ q and a residual; that is, ´ = np¯ q+¶, where
n is a nonnegative integer and ¶ is a nonnegative real number less than p¯ q. Then, by (3)
and (4),




¯ q ¡ (¯A(m0))
n
·





holds. On the other hand, by (2) and (5),
















Below, we obtain (p;¸;¾) as functions of m0. First, 1¡m0 =
R
(0;1) fd´ can be written
as follows:
1 ¡ m0 =
Z
(0;p¯ q]
fd´ = ¸p2¯ q2 + ¾p¯ q: (8)












By (7), (8), (9), and d =
a¯ q
¯ c , we obtain
p =
Ma¯A(m0)
(1 ¡ m0)¯ c
; (10)
¸ =
3(1 ¡ m0)3(2 ¡ ¯dA(m0))
M2¯3d3(A(m0))3 ; (11)
¾ =
2(1 ¡ m0)2(¡3 + 2¯dA(m0))
M¯2d2(A(m0))2 : (12)
3If V (0) > 0, then an agent with a small amount of money does not choose to be a buyer. Indeed, by
(3), lim´#0 V (´) = ¯V (0) < V (0) when V (0) > 0.
5(IV) Next, we check the optimality of the speciﬁed strategy.
(i) The optimality of the strategy of an agent with money holding ´ > 0:
First, we show that there exists a p(´) ¸ p in (1). If ´ 2 (0;p¯ q], then by (6),














holds, then she clearly chooses the maximum amount she can buy, and otherwise she




; for ´ 2 (0;p¯ q]: (13)
Then, (1) is optimal for ´ 2 (0;p¯ q]. Moreover, p(´) ¸ p clearly holds. Similar arguments
apply to the case of ´ 2 (p¯ q;1).
Next, we check an incentive for an agent with ´ > 0 to become a buyer instead of
becoming a seller and oﬀering (p0;q0). By (1) and (13), for any p0 >
p
¯A(m0), no buyer
accepts such an oﬀer on the equilibrium, and then the value is the same as that of an oﬀer
(p00;0), where p00 ·
p




























˜ V (´;´0) =
(
V (´ + ´0); if ´0 · p0q0;
V (´ + p0q0); if ´0 > p0q0:
(14)














¡ (1 ¡ ¯)V (´): (15)
6Below, we show
V (´ + ´0) ¡ V (´) · aA(m0)
´0
p
; for ´0 2 (0;p¯ q]: (16)
First, there exits a unique nonnegative integer n such that np¯ q · ´ < (n + 1)p¯ q. There
are two cases: (a) ´ + ´0 < (n + 1)p¯ q and (b) ´ + ´0 ¸ (n + 1)p¯ q. In case (a), by (6) and
¯A(m0) < 1,




¯ q ¡ (¯A(m0))
n
·
¯ q ¡ (1 ¡ ¯A(m0))







¯ q ¡ (¯A(m0))
n
·
¯ q ¡ (1 ¡ ¯A(m0))










In case (b), by (6) and ¯A(m0) < 1,




¯ q ¡ (¯A(m0))
n+1
·
¯ q ¡ (1 ¡ ¯A(m0))







¯ q ¡ (¯A(m0))
n
·
¯ q ¡ (1 ¡ ¯A(m0))






(1 ¡ ¯A(m0))(n + 1)¯ q + ¯A(m0)
´0
p











The fourth line is obtained by ´ ¸ (n + 1)p¯ q ¡ ´0. This completes the proof of (16).
(6), (14), and (16) imply
˜ V (´;´0) ¡ V (´) · aA(m0)
´0
p
; for ´0 2 (0;p¯ q]:















This is equal to zero by the ﬁrst equality of (7), and thus (15) is non-positive and she
becomes a buyer.
7(ii) The optimality of the strategy of an agent without money:
By the construction, an agent without money is indiﬀerent between a buyer and a seller.
Thus she has an incentive to be a seller. As in the latter part of (i), we restrict our






and q0 2 [0; ¯ q]. By (1) and (6), the













where ˜ V is deﬁned in (14). If p0q0 ¸ p¯ q, ˜ V (0;´0) = V (´0) for any ´0 2 (0;p¯ q]. Then, (17) is
the same for all p0q0 ¸ p¯ q, and therefore the oﬀer (p; ¯ q) is optimal. If p0q0 · p¯ q,
Z
(0;p¯ q]

















˜ V (0;p¯ q)f(´0)d´0;
where the inequality is obtained by (6) and (14). Then, the oﬀer (p; ¯ q) is optimal. This
completes the proof of (IV).
(V) Finally, we check f(´) ¸ 0 for all ´ 2 (0;p¯ q]. Since f is linear, it suﬃces to show
f(0) ¸ 0 and f(p¯ q) ¸ 0. By (10), (11), and (12),
f(0) = ¾ =
2(1 ¡ m0)2(¡3 + 2¯dA(m0))
M¯2d2(A(m0))2
and
f(p¯ q) = 2¸p¯ q + ¾ =
2(1 ¡ m0)2(3 ¡ ¯dA(m0))
M¯2d2(A(m0))2
hold. A suﬃcient condition for f(0) ¸ 0 and f(p¯ q) ¸ 0 is clearly
3
2
· ¯dA(m0) · 3:
By the assumption d · 3, ¯dA(m0) · 3 is always satisﬁed. It is easily veriﬁed that
3





8Setting ¯ = 3k
3(k¡1)+2d, we can show that for any ¯ 2 (¯;1) there exists a continuum of m0




¯(2d¡3) follows from ¯ > ¯. Note that the stationarity of money holdings distribution
clearly holds. This concludes the proof.
We show that any equilibrium in Theorem 1 satisﬁes the commodity-money reﬁnement
deﬁned by Wallace and Zhu [6]. Wallace and Zhu assume that agents receive utility "°(´) by
consuming ´ amount of money, where " ¸ 0 and ° : R+ ! R+ is diﬀerentiable, bounded,
strictly increasing, and concave, and satisﬁes °(0) = 0 and °0(0) ﬁnite. A stationary
equilibrium in the case of ﬁat money (i.e., " = 0) satisﬁes the commodity-money reﬁnement
if and only if it is a limit of some sequence of stationary equilibria as " # 0, i.e., a limit of
commodity money equilibria.
By (6), in any stationary equilibrium described in Theorem 1, the value function is
positively linear with respect to money holding ´ 2 [0;p¯ q]. This implies that, even in the
case of commodity money, if " is suﬃciently small, then agents never consume the money.
Therefore, the set of equilibria in the case of small " > 0 is the same as that in the case of
" = 0.
Corollary 1 Any equilibrium in Theorem 1 satisﬁes the commodity-money reﬁnement.
This implies that there is a continuum of stationary equilibria that satisﬁes the commodity-
money reﬁnement.
We deﬁne the welfare as the average of values. Then by (6), (7), (8), and (9), we obtain








In other words, the smaller m0 is, the higher the welfare level is, as long as V is an
equilibrium value function. Then m0 =
3k(1¡¯)
¯(2d¡3) yields the highest welfare level among this
class of equilibria. This implies the above indeterminacy result is real; there is a continuum
of Pareto-rankable stationary equilibria.
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